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Abstract 
We assess the impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations of the two very-
long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the Eurosystem in December 
2011 and February 2012 for the case of Spain. To do so we use bank-firm level information 
from a sample of more than one million lending relationships over two years. Our 
methodology tackles the two main identification challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit 
supply from demand; and (ii) the endogeneity of VLTRO bids, as banks with more 
deteriorated funding conditions were more likely both to ask for a large amount of funds 
and to restrict credit supply. First, we exploit the fact that many firms simultaneously 
borrow from several banks to effectively control for firm-specific credit demand. Second, 
we exhaustively control for banks’ funding difficulties by constructing several measures of 
balance-sheet strength and by including bank fixed effects. Our findings suggest that the 
VLTROs had a positive moderately-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to firms, 
providing evidence of a bank lending channel in the context of unconventional monetary 
policy. We also find that the effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by 
credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. 
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, VLTRO, credit supply, bank lending channel. 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, G21. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
El presente trabajo evalúa el impacto en el crédito a sociedades no financieras de las dos 
operaciones de financiación a tres años (VLTRO, en sus siglas en inglés) efectuadas por el 
Eurosistema en diciembre de 2011 y febrero de 2012 en el caso de España. Para ello se usa 
información a escala de banco-empresa de una muestra de más de un millón de relaciones 
de crédito durante dos años. La metodología implementada hace frente a los dos principales 
problemas de identificación: i) cómo separar la oferta de crédito de su demanda, y ii) la 
endogenidad de las peticiones de fondos en las VLTRO, puesto que es probable que los 
bancos con condiciones de financiación más deterioradas pidieran más fondos y contrajeran 
más el crédito. Primero, se usa el hecho de que muchas empresas tienen préstamos con 
varios bancos al mismo tiempo para controlar por la demanda de crédito específica a cada 
empresa. Segundo, se controla exhaustivamente por las dificultades de financiación de los 
bancos mediante la construcción de diversas medidas de fortaleza financiera y mediante la 
inclusión de efectos fijos de banco. Los resultados sugieren que las VLTRO tuvieron un 
efecto positivo, de tamaño moderado, en la oferta de crédito bancario a las empresas, lo que 
evidencia la existencia de un canal de crédito bancario en el marco de políticas monetarias no 
convencionales. También se encuentra que el efecto fue mayor en los bancos con menor 
liquidez y que dicho efecto fue principalmente impulsado por el crédito a pymes, dado que no 
hubo impacto alguno en la oferta de préstamos a grandes empresas. 
Palabras clave: políticas monetarias no convencionales, oferta de crédito, canal de crédito 
bancario. 
Códigos JEL: E52, E58, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
The intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis in the second half of 2011 hampered 
euro area banks’ access to market based-funding, both in the bond and monetary markets, 
especially in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In those countries, bank CDS soared 
in parallel with the spreads of their sovereign bonds against the corresponding German 
figures, while their stock prices plummeted. Euro area banks mainly relied on the funds 
provided by the Eurosystem to sustain their liquidity position and their funding and 
deleveraging pressures raised the risk of disruptions in the credit supply to the non-financial 
private sector.  
Against this backdrop, the ECB Governing Council decided to implement 
additional non-standard policy measures on 8 December 2011, which aimed to forestall 
a further contraction of credit through the mitigation of liquidity and funding risks. The 
agreed package of measures included two very long term refinancing operations 
(VLTROs) with a maturity of three years and the option of early repayment after one year, 
carried out as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment. The interest rates of those 
operations were set much lower than those borne by banks in wholesale markets at the 
time.1 The first VLTRO, conducted on 21 December 2011, provided €489 billion to 523 
banks.2 The second one took place on 29 February 2012 and allotted €530 billion to 800 
credit institutions. Adding up the two, the total net refinancing amounted to more than 
€500 billion3
All the above figures imply that the VLTROs can be best regarded as a large positive 
liquidity shock to euro-area banks. But, since lending to the non-financial private sector kept 
declining –as shown for the case of Spanish firms in Figure 1- serious doubts about its 
effectiveness were raised. Nevertheless, the absence of a natural counterfactual, i.e., what 
would have happened had the Eurosystem not implemented the VLTROs, lead us to consider 
the following research question: would have lending declined much more if the VLTROs 
hadn’t taken place? To put it differently, given the extremely weak macroeconomic conditions 
prevailing in that period –which reduced credit demand and increased credit risk- and the 
liquidity and funding risks experienced by banks –which constrained credit supply- did the 
VLTROs prevent a credit crunch? 
. The total liquidity injection was massive: it increased the size of the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet by more than a fifth and accounted for 80% of the monetary 
base in the euro area, 20% of the total bank credit to euro area firms and almost 11% of 
the area’s GDP (Andrade et al., 2015).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
1.The rate was fixed at the average rate of the main refinancing operations over the life of the respective operation. 
Interest had to be paid when the respective operation matured.  
2. This amount included €45.7 billion transferred from the 12-month LTRO allotted in October.  
3. For further details see the ECB Monthly Bulletin of January and March 2012.  
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Figure 1: credit growth to non-financial corporations (Spain) 
Source: Bank of Spain. The yellow area corresponds to the period between December 2012-February 
2013 when the two VLTROs took place.  
To address those questions we use bank-firm level information from a sample of 
more than one million lending relationships drawn from the Credit Register of Banco de 
España. The case of Spain is particularly useful to evaluate the effectiveness of the VLTROs 
through the bank lending channel because it was severely hit by the financial market tensions 
that preceded those policies, it is one of the largest economies in the euro area and its firms 
largely rely on bank financing. Moreover, the bank lending channel is expected to be 
particularly important when banks have limited alternatives to retail deposits as a funding 
source (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) and that was precisely the case, as access to wholesale 
capital markets was very restricted for most Spanish banks in that period.  
Regarding the methodology, to assess the causal impact of the VLTROs on credit 
supply two main identification challenges must be addressed. First, credit supply must be 
disentangled from credit demand. Following the methodology first implemented by Gan 
(2007) and Khwaya and Mian (2008), we can identify shifts in credit supply by controlling for 
credit demand. This approach exploits the fact that many firms simultaneously borrow from 
several banks, which allows to compare credit growth across different lenders for the same 
firm in the same period. This within-firm comparison controls for all observable and 
unobservable, time-invariant and time-varying firm characteristics, including firm-specific 
changes in credit demand and risk. 
The second identification challenge comes from the fact that the liquidity provided in 
those operations was not randomly allocated across banks, but freely chosen by each 
bidding bank and only limited by its available collateral. Hence, banks facing strong funding 
and deleveraging pressures were likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain 
credit supply, implying that the VLTRO bids would be an endogenous regressor in naïve 
specifications. To tackle this problem we exhaustively control for banks’ funding difficulties by 
constructing several measures of balance-sheet strength (capital, liquidity, credit risk, etc) 
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using the confidential supervisory reports owned by Banco de España and we include bank 
fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.    
Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the 
supply of bank credit to firms in the twelve4 months after the first VLTRO (December 2011- 
November 2012), providing evidence of a bank lending channel in the context of 
unconventional monetary policy. Specifically, the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on 
annual credit growth ranged between 0.8% and 1%. Of course, this does not mean that the 
VLTROs actually increased the available credit, but that they reduced the rate of contraction 
of lending: if they had not been implemented, credit to non-financial corporations would have 
decreased at a rate 0.8% higher than it did5
We also study whether the VLTROs had a heterogenous impact on banks depending 
of their balance-sheet strength. We find that, as in Jiménez et al. (2012),
.  
6 the impact was 
greater on illiquid banks but, unlike their work, we find no differential effect regarding capital. 
We have two complementary explanations to this finding. First, as argued by Albertazzi et al. 
(2014), during systemic crises the nature of the bank lending channel may change. Second, 
regulatory capital, rather than leverage, may be the appropriate variable to look at during 
those crises7
Finally, we find that the VLTROs had a sizeable impact on the credit to SMEs, while 
they had no effect on the loans to large firms. This is an important aspect to take into account 
when assessing the effectiveness of the VLTROs because SMEs are much more vulnerable to 
a credit crunch than larger companies, as they often do not have access to alternative 
sources of external finance (debt and equity markets).  
.  
Nevertheless, a limitation of our study is that it only evaluates the direct impact of the 
VLTROs on bank credit, but there may be important indirect channels we ignore. For instance, by 
bolstering investors’ confidence, the VLTROs may have improved banks’ access to wholesale 
markets, which may have been translated into more lending to the private sector. Consistent with 
this idea, Dubecq et al. (2014) find that the VLTROs helped to ease the euro interbank market. In 
addition, according to Acharya and Steffen (2014), the VLTROs, by increasing the demand for 
sovereign debt by banks, helped to reduce sovereign spreads. Due to the positive correlation 
between sovereign spreads and private sector interest rates (Pancrazi et al., 2014), the VLTROs 
would have indirectly reduced the borrowing costs borne by households and non-financial 
corporations. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the VLTROs helped to repair banks’ balance 
sheets, which could have had an indirect further impact on lending. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant 
literature on the subject. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy in detail. Section 4 
explains the data sources and the sample selection and Section 5 describes the variables 
used in the empirical analyses. Section 6 comments on the main results, while Section 7 
displays some robustness analyses. Section 8 concludes.  
                                                                            
4. Notice that, as the VLTROs had a maturity of 36 months with the option of early repayment after one year, any 
potential effect on the supply of credit is likely to be temporary. We restrict our study to the twelve months after the first 
VLTRO to identify the full liquidity shock implied by the VLTROs, i.e., before any possible repayment.  
5. The average annual growth rate of the credit to non-financial corporations in the twelve months after the first VLTRO 
(between December 2011 and November 2012) was -5.1%, 
6. Jiménez et al. (2012) also use the Spanish Credit Register to analyse the bank lending channel. However, they focus 
on monetary shocks measured by changes in money market rates, rather than on unconventional monetary policies.  
7. In fact, Albertazzi et al. (2014), who use the supervisory Tier 1 capital ratio, find that the VLTROs were more effective 
in improving lending supply to SMEs (compared to larger firms) for illiquid but well-capitalised banks. 
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2 Literature review  
While there is a large body of literature on unconventional monetary policy (see, inter alia, 
reviews in Cecioni et al. 2012 and Joyce et al. 2012) few works have specifically studied the 
impact of the VLTROs. Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2013) use (aggregate) information on 
credit supply conditions from the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS) to identify the credit 
supply shock implied by the VLTROs in a panel-VAR for euro area countries. Their 
counterfactual experiments point to a relevant increase in bank loans to non-financial 
corporations and a moderate narrowing of lending rate spreads, together with a significant 
increase in the euro area real GDP and a somewhat higher inflation over the next two-to-three 
years. With more disaggregated information, Casiraghi et al. (2012) use bank-level data and 
the individual answers of the Italian banks to the BLS to assess the impact of the ECB’s 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP), the VLTROs and the Outright Monetary Operations 
(OMT) on government yields, money market interest rates and credit availability. Then they 
use their estimations, together with the Bank of Italy model of the Italian economy, to gauge 
their macroeconomic impact. In the specific case of the VLTROs, using both regression and 
event-study methodologies, they find that the VLTROs significantly eased credit supply 
conditions –as proxied by the BLS index of credit supply- and substantially reduced the 
interest rates paid by Italian banks in the interbank market8
Besides our paper, there are only two other works that –to the best of our 
knowledge- study the impact of VLTROs on credit growth using bank-firm level data. 
Albertazzi et al. (2014) make use of the loan-level information of the Italian Credit Register and 
the fact that many firms borrow from several lenders to identify shifts in credit demand from 
shifts in credit supply, following the methodology first implemented by Gan (2007) and 
Khwaya and Mian (2008). They also control for the endogeneity of the VLTROs take-up 
(weaker banks are likely to borrow more funds and to restrict more credit supply) using an IV 
approach and bank fixed effects. While they do not find significant effects on lending growth 
for the average bank-firm lending relationship, they do find that the VLTROs were more 
effective in improving lending supply for SMES (compared to larger firms) for banks 
characterised by both a relatively large funding gap
. They also find that the overall 
impact of the three policies on GDP growth, mainly via the credit channel, was a cumulative 
increase of 2.7 pp over the period 2012-2013.  
9
                                                                            
8. A similar result is found by Dubecq et al. (2014) in their analysis of the impact of the SMP, the VLTROs and the OMT 
on both liquidity and credit risks in the interbank market. Specifically, the VLTROs reduced liquidity premia by around 50 
bp, while their effect on credit risk was much smaller.  
 and a relatively favourable capitalization. 
Andrade et al. (2015) use the loan-level information of the French Credit Register and 
individual bank balance-sheet information, as well as data on credit-risk rating and balance 
sheets for a subsample of firms, to tackle the same identification issues. Their main finding is 
that the VLTROs had a positive and sizeable impact on the supply of banking credit. They 
also find that the first VLTRO (December 2011) was more effective than the second one 
(February 2012) and that there was substantial heterogeneity in their impact across borrowers 
and lenders. Specifically, the VLTROs had a greater impact for larger companies, with the 
smallest firms not benefiting at all.  Moreover, the effect was higher for firms whose loans 
were eligible to the Additional Credit Claim (ACC) program and for firms with more banking 
relationships, and lower for companies with long relationships with their banks. Finally, more 
capitalised banks lent marginally more.  
9. Defined as the difference between retail loans and retail funding over retail loans.  
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3 Identification strategy  
We can express our identification strategy with the following equations:  
∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾_𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−1𝑘𝐾𝑘=1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡           (1) 
𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖 ∙ 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 2011𝑀12)              (2) 
where i refers to bank, j to firm and t to year:month;  𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 is our key regressor, the 
product of the gross amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs scaled by the bank’s total 
assets (𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖) and an indicator variable 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 2011𝑀12) that equals 1 since December 
2012 (when the first VLTRO took place); 𝑎𝑗𝑡 are time-varying firm fixed effects, 𝑏𝑖 are bank 
fixed effects, BANK_VAR are time-varying bank characteristics and 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a regression 
disturbance. Following Jiménez et al (2012) BANK_VAR are lagged one period to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns.  
Our goal is to identify the causal impact of the provision of liquidity via the two 
VLTROs on the supply of credit by Spanish banks to Spanish firms. The first identification 
challenge is to disentangle changes in credit supply from changes in credit demand, as what 
we observe is the equilibrium outcome, credit growth, and those changes are often correlated 
(Bentolila et al., 2013). For instance, a credit contraction in the midst of a financial crisis can 
be due to a reduction in credit supply (banks reduce credit supply to increase their capital and 
liquidity buffers) and to a downward shift of credit demand (firms reduce their demand for 
credit as they find less profitable investment opportunities).  
The second identification challenge arises from the possible correlation between 
banks’ recourse to non-standard measures such as VLTROs and supply problems. As banks 
with more deteriorated funding conditions are more likely both to borrow more funds in the 
VLTROs and to cut loan supply, our variable of interest, the liquidity provided by the VLTROs, 
may be endogenous.  
We address the first problem by exploiting the fact that firms often borrow from 
several lenders, a strategy first implemented by Gan (2007) and Khwaja and Mian (2008). This 
allows us to include in the regression time-varying firm fixed effects 𝑎𝑗𝑡 (i.e., a dummy for 
every firm-year:month combination) that control for all (observed and unobserved) firm 
heterogeneity, including credit demand. Not controlling for demand would imply an omitted 
variable bias if 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡,𝑎𝑗𝑡) ≠ 0, which is likely to be case, as the same factors that 
influence banks’ recourse to VLTROs (economic downturn, financial distress) are expected to 
affect firm’s borrowing behaviour, as captured by 𝑎𝑗𝑡. The sign of the bias cannot be 
ascertained a priori, as it depends on the borrowing behaviour of firms during recessions. 
Two scenarios can arise. First, if firms demand less credit during recessions (because of less 
positive NPV projects), then we should expect a downward bias in our estimates because 
there would be a negative correlation between 𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 and the omitted variable 𝑎𝑗𝑡 (the 
deeper the recession, the higher the bids by banks in the VLTROs and the lower the demand 
by firms). Second, if firms demand more credit during recessions (to avoid financial distress or 
having to sell core assets to offset their operating losses), then we should expect an upward 
bias in our estimates because there would be a positive correlation between 𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 and the 
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omitted variable 𝑎𝑗𝑡 (the deeper the recession, the higher the bids by banks in the VLTROs 
and the higher the demand by firms)10
To address the second problem we need to control for banks’ funding conditions in 
our regressions to ensure 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟�𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡� = 0. To do so we include a very 
comprehensive set of time-varying bank characteristics that capture factors such as liquidity, 
capital, loan quality, diversification of the credit portfolio, profitability and size (see their 
description in section 5) as well as bank fixed effects. Even if this approach did not fully 
remove this bias, we would know its sign: we would expect a downward bias in the 
coefficient on the VLTRO uptake, as banks with more (less) deteriorated funding conditions 
are expected to borrow more (less) funds in the VLTROs and to exhibit a lower (higher) credit 
growth. Hence our identification strategy would estimate the lower bound of the true causal 
impact.  
. 
 
                                                                            
10. Another source of bias would occur if firms are not randomly assigned to banks and banks’ bids at the VLTROs 
depend on their financial strength. If weaker firms tend to match with weaker banks (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) and 
weaker banks borrow more funds in the VLTROs, the sign of the bias will depend on the borrowing behaviour of weak 
firms.  
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4  Data and sample selection  
The main data sources are the Spanish Credit Register (CIR) and individual monthly bank 
balance sheets, both from Banco de España.  The CIR contains monthly information on all 
bank-firm relationships over a reporting threshold of 6,000 € for credit institutions operating in 
Spain. We focus on credit11 granted12 to all non-financial Spanish companies.13
We collect data referring to the 11 months before and after the first VLTRO, i.e., from 
January 2011 to November 2012. We do not extend our sample period beyond November 
2012 because of two reasons. First, in December 2012 there was a transfer of assets –mainly 
loans to construction and real estate companies- from the four nationalised Spanish financial 
institutions
 As loans to 
companies are normally much larger than the reporting threshold, we can claim that we have 
the whole population of loans to those firms.  Unconsolidated bank balance sheet data are 
drawn from the supervisory reports that banks have to file every month. We also use the 
gross amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs by each Spanish bank, which come 
from the Bank of Spain’s Operations Department. 
14 to the SAREB (Company for the Management of Assets proceeding from 
Restructuring of the Banking System) but the CIR does not identify those loans, which are not 
inside banks’ balance sheets any longer15
Concerning sample selection, we exclude sole proprietorships because some loans 
for those businesses may be smaller than the CIR’s reporting threshold, potentially leading to 
a selection bias. To include firm fixed effects in our regressions we only keep those borrowing 
from at least two banks: those companies accounted for 38% of the total number of firms 
and 75% of the credit to non-financial companies registered in the CIR in December 2011. As 
for credit institutions, we keep all commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives 
(around 95% of the Spanish financial system) while we remove financial credit 
establishments.
. Second, as after one year banks had the option to 
repay any part of the amounts they were allotted in the operations, finishing our sample 
period in November 2012 allows us to identify the full liquidity shock implied by the VLTROs. 
16
                                                                            
11. We include any instrument through which banks can provide credit to firms: financial loans, commercial loans, 
documentary credit, leasing, factoring, repos, securities lending and loans or credits transferred to a third party. 
 Non-Spanish branches and subsidiaries are excluded because the former 
could not obtain funds in the VLTROs and the latter could give them to their parent banks, 
which could use those funds to grant loans outside Spain. We also discard some specialised 
subsidiaries of Spanish banks because they did not participate in the VLTROs but obtained 
those funds indirectly through intra-group loans. Small credit institutions that only report 
quarterly information, as well as private banking institutions, are also dropped. Finally, we take 
out Spain’s public bank, Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) because a major part of the funds it 
channels to the private sector are indirectly provided through mediation facilities, in which ICO 
provides the funds to credit institutions, which grant the loans and assume the credit risk 
12. We include undrawn credit facilities to better capture the supply of credit by banks, as credit drawn is largely 
affected by the borrower’s need for funds and, consequently, it is also determined by demand shifts.  
13. Specifically, we include publicly limited companies, limited liability companies, unlimited liability companies and 
companies with a hybrid nature. We do not include sole proprietorships. 
14. BFA-Bankia, Catalunya Banc, NCG Banco-Banco Gallego and Banco de Valencia. 
15. Another asset transfer, of smaller magnitude, took place in February 2013, involving other four banks: Banco Mare 
Nostrum, CEISS, Caja3 and Liberbank. 
16. Financial credit establishments are prohibited from receiving repayable funds from the public in the form of deposits, 
loans, temporary assignment of financial assets or other comparable instruments. This restriction makes it possible to 
release them from the obligation to be covered by a deposit guarantee fund. Their main activities are usually leasing, 
factoring and consumer credit.  
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associated with each operation under the conditions established by ICO. Hence the inclusion 
of ICO would lead to a downward bias in the estimation of the relationship between VLTRO 
uptake and credit growth.17
After applying all these filters and some outlier deletion, we end up with a sample of 
more than 12 million observations, with 42 banks, 315,000 firms, more than one million firm-
bank relationships and 23 months.  
 The remaining 42 banks accounted for 84% of the total credit to 
firms in December 2011.  
A final issue that deserves some comments is our treatment of the M&A that took 
place during the sample period. We always treat them as an acquisition by the largest bank.18 
The alternative option, regarding them as the birth of a new bank, would imply breaks in the 
series and, in some cases, having observations for some banks only after the VLTROs took 
place, which could seriously undermine our identification strategy.19 But, since our preferred 
option generates jumps in the series, we deal with them by deleting the outliers of credit 
growth20
                                                                            
17. In any case, ICO’s balance sheet only accounted for a 2.4% of the Spanish financial sector in December 2010.  
 -as drastic increases in that variable may be due to a firm having outstanding loans 
with several banks that merge- and by the inclusion of intervention dummies to control for 
jumps in some financial ratios (e.g., capital).  Nevertheless, the paper’s main results do not 
change when we treat a merger as the birth of a new bank, as displayed in Appendix B.  
18. Measured by total assets in the month before the event.  
19. As our key regressor is the product of the gross amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs scaled by the bank’s 
total assets (VLTROi) and an indicator variable I(t ≥ 2011M12) that equals 1 since the implementation of the first 
VLTRO, for those banks the value of the regressor would be constant over time. As we also include bank fixed effects in 
our regressions, those banks would have to be excluded.  
20. Specifically, we delete observations whose annualised monthly credit growth rates are above the 99th percentile of 
the distribution. 
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5 Variables 
The dependent variable is the monthly credit growth rate, displayed in annualised terms, 
which is computed as changes in the stock of bank loans. Our key regressor (𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡) is the 
product of the gross amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs scaled by the bank’s total 
assets (𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖) and an indicator variable 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 2011𝑀12) that equals 1 since December 
2012 (when the first VLTRO took place).  
The bank controls aim to capture bank characteristics associated with lending 
behaviour. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of net liquid assets (i.e., net of their respective short-term 
liabilities) to total assets, where by liquid assets we mean cash, deposits with central banks 
and other credit institutions and debt securities net of deposits payable to central banks.21 
For robustness, we also use Liquidity Ratio 2, in which we use a more narrow definition of 
liquid assets and we only include cash and net deposits with central banks and other credit 
institutions.22
Capital Ratio is the ratio of the bank’s core capital (total equity plus retained 
earnings) to total assets. For robustness, we also use Capital Ratio 2, in which bank’s net 
worth substitutes for core capital. Notice that we do not use risk-weighted assets, so that 
ours is not a supervisory capital ratio, but a leverage ratio. We also include the non-
performing loan ratio (NPL ratio) to measure loan quality, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry to capture diversification, the return on assets 
(ROA) and bank’s total assets (in 2011 euros) to proxy size.  
 To take into account the possible different impact of sovereign debt holdings 
from other types of liquid assets, we also compute the ratio of domestic sovereign debt to 
total assets (Sovereign Debt). Other variables that proxy liquidity risk are the Loan-To-Deposit 
Ratio and residents’ and non-residents’ deposits to total assets.  
As firm-bank relationship variables we include Relationship Length, the number of 
months the firm had a working relationship with the bank, and Number Relations, the number 
of banks the firm operates with.  
Finally, we also use intervention dummies to control for jumps in capital, liquidity, 
deposit and npl ratios and several sets of fixed effects, as discussed in section 3.  
Table 1 provides a thorough description of the variables and the data sources. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables can be found in Table 2. The average bank in the sample 
borrowed an amount of funds equivalent to almost 9% of its balance sheet at the two 
VLTROs, while the bank that borrowed the most relative to its size obtained a 36.7%. 11 
banks did no borrow any funds. We can also see that there is substantial variation across 
banks and time periods in their levels of liquidity (Liquidity Ratio, Liquidity Ratio 2, Sovereign 
Debt) and capital. In order to correct for high skewness some of these variables will be 
expressed in logs in our regressions. The correlation matrix of the variables is displayed in 
Appendix B. 
                                                                            
21. We include all debt securities net of deposits payable to central banks to proxy the remaining assets that can posted 
as collateral to get funds from the Eurosystem.  
22. For further robustness, we have also computed another ratio in which the liquid assets are cash, net deposits with 
central banks and other credit institutions and public debt with a maturity up to one year. The correlations between this 
variable and Liquidity Ratio and Liquidity Ratio 2 are 0.96 and 0.99, respectively.  
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Table 1: description of variables 
 
 
 
Table 2: descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Variation Source
Credit Growth Monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. By bank-firm
Credit Register
Banco de España
VLTRO Funds borrowed at the two VLTROs to  total assets. By bank
Operations Department
Banco de España
Liquidity Ratio
Cash, net deposits with central banks and other credit institutions 
and debt securities net of deposits payable to central banks to total 
By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Liquidity Ratio 2
Cash and net deposits with central banks and other credit institutions 
to total assets.
By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Sovereing Debt Domestic sovereign debt to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Loan to Deposits Ratio between the loans to the private sector and deposits. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Capital Ratio Core capital (total equity plus retained earnings) to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Capital Ratio 2 Net worth to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
NPL Ratio Non-performing loans to total loans to the private sector. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Resident Deposits Deposits by non-financial private residents to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Non-resident Deposits Deposits by non-financial private non-residents to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
ROA Net income to total assets. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Real Total Assets Total Assets in 2011 euros. By bank
Supervisory reports
Banco de España
Relationship Length Number of months the firm had a working relationship with the bank. By bank-firm
Credit Register
Banco de España
Number Relations Number of banks the firm operates with. By firm-time
Credit Register
Banco de España
HHI
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry  
(2 digits)
By bank-time
Credit Register
Banco de España
Variable Scale Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Credit Growth (i,j,t) % (annualised) 12,181,556 -13.37 28.57 -100 91.33
VLTRO (i) % 42 9.69 8.15 0 36.61
Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 1.97 6.44 -65.36 36.07
Liquidity Ratio 2  (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 -4.81 4.25 -65.36 45.35
Sovereign Debt  (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 6.14 2.38 0.00 25.05
Loan to Deposits (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 188.70 35.43 80.08 471.29
Capital Ratio (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 5.89 1.90 1.14 14.09
Capital Ratio 2 (t-1) % 12,181,556 6.12 2.37 -11.35 14.15
NPL Ratio  (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 7.75 4.29 0.09 28.03
Resident Deposits (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 31.17 10.42 0.63 74.37
Non-resident Deposits (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 8.39 6.39 0.00 24.12
ROA (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 -6.10 31.93 -629.19 18.90
Real Total Assets (i, t-1) Millions € 12,181,556 192,312.00 153,743.20 1,623.72 487,297.40
Relationship Length  (i,j, t-1) months 12,181,556 9.56 6.15 1.00 23.00
Number Relations  (i, t-1) # banks 12,181,556 3.75 2.40 2.00 33.00
HHI  (i, t-1) % 12,181,556 17.09 8.32 5.69 46.48
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6 Main results  
Our first set of results is displayed in Table 3. Column (1) is just an OLS regression, whose 
estimates are expected to be biased and inconsistent because of the identification challenges 
explained in section 3. The coefficient on 𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 (henceforth, VLTRO) is negative but 
insignificant. The coefficient on VLTRO turns positive but insignificant when we add time-
invariant firm fixed effects in column (2) and when we include firm-month fixed effects in (3). 
The coefficient becomes positive and significant at a 5% in column (4), which is consistent 
with the intuition that bank fixed effects mitigate the downward bias that arises from not fully 
controlling banks’ balance-sheet strength and its correlation with VLTRO uptake. Moreover, 
as we know the sign of that bias, in case our strategy did not fully remove it, we could claim 
that the coefficient on VLTRO is the lower bound of the true causal effect.  
Regarding statistical inference, the standard errors are always clustered at the bank 
level to deal with serial correlation within banks over time, one of the solutions advocated by 
Bertrand et al. (2004)23, as we cannot rule out that the regression errors are serially correlated 
even after controlling for bank fixed effects. Alternatively, we have clustered at the bank-time 
level, the level in which the regressor of interest varies, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke 
(2009).24 This would imply a large number of available clusters, a necessary condition for the 
consistency of clustered standard errors25
To estimate the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on credit growth we make a 
weighted sum of the individual impact of those VLTROs on the credit growth of each bank, 
where the weights are computed as the ratio of the bank’s outstanding loans to all loans in 
the sample. Algebraically:  
, but at the expense of not accounting for within-
bank serial correlation. The results –available upon request- are very similar, just displaying a 
less conservative standard error for our key variable (0.024 vs. 0.029 in specification (4)), 
which renders VLTRO significant at 1%.  
𝐴𝑔𝑔_𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝜕∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝜕𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡
∙ 𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 · 𝜔𝑖𝐼𝑖=1                (3) 
where         
𝜕∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝜕𝑉𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽                 (4) 
and  
 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝐼𝑖=𝐼                             (5) 
Using the estimate of the coefficient on VLTRO of our preferred method (firm-month 
fixed effects and bank fixed effects), the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on annual 
                                                                            
23. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that this technique works well when the number of clusters is large, meaning by “large” 
50 U.S. states in their empirical application. Similar numbers are suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009). As in our 
application we have 42 clusters (banks), we believe that the number of clusters is large enough.  
24. Moulton (1986) shows that, in the presence of intragroup correlation, conventional OLS standard errors or standard 
errors clustered at a level below the group underestimate the population standard errors. 
25. The asymptotic justification of cluster-robust standard errors assumes that the numbers of clusters goes to infinity. 
With a small number of clusters the cluster-robust standard errors are downwards biased. But, in any case, Cameron et 
al. (2008) consider “few” five to thirty clusters, while in our application we have 42 clusters.  
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credit growth was 0.8%. Of course, this does not mean that the VLTROs actually increased 
the available credit, but that they reduced the rate of contraction of lending: if they had not 
been implemented, credit to non-financial corporations would have decreased at a rate 0.8% 
higher than it did.  As the average annual growth rate of the credit to non-financial 
corporations in the twelve months after the first VLTRO (between December 2011 and 
November 2012) was -5.1%26
With respect to the controls, column (4) shows that a higher Loan-To-Deposit Ratio 
is associated with higher credit growth within the same bank (as we include bank fixed 
effects).
, we consider that the VLTROs had a moderate-sized effect.  
27
  
 Higher residents’ deposits to total assets also lead to higher credit growth, while 
the opposite occurs in the case of non-residents’ deposits, probably because more stable 
retail funding incentivises banks to lend more. A longer relationship between the firm and the 
bank (Relationship Length) also implies more credit, consistent with the findings on 
relationship lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994). By contrast, more industry 
concentrated loan portfolios (higher HHI) are related with lower credit growth. Finally, notice 
that Capital Ratio is negative (and significant) in column (1), at variance with the conventional 
wisdom. This finding confirms our intuition that, in the period of analysis (2011-2012), strong 
deleveraging pressures and weak credit demand forced under-capitalised banks to increase 
their capital and reduce lending at the same time. Hence the need to control for credit 
demand and bank unobserved heterogeneity, as progressively done in columns (2)-(4).  
                                                                            
26. Source: Banco de España.  
27. By contrast, the coefficient on the Loan-To-Deposit Ratio is negative when bank fixed effects are not included 
[columns (1)-(3)] so that variability across banks is also exploited. In other words, banks with higher LTD ratios exhibit 
lower credit growth, probably because they are exposed to higher liquidity risk.  
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Table 3: impact of VLTROs on credit  
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
 
 
We also wish to study whether the transmission of non-conventional monetary policy 
such as the VLTROs may be heterogeneous and it may depend on banks’ characteristics. 
For that purpose, Table 4 shows the results of the most complete specification (whole set of 
fixed effects) in which we add the interactions of our key regressor with the liquidity and 
capital ratios. In column (1) the negative coefficient on the interaction between liquidity and 
VLTRO means that the positive impact of VLTROS on credit growth was higher on illiquid 
banks, consistent with previous evidence on the bank lending channel (e.g. Jiménez et al., 
2012). By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction between capital and VLTRO is not 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) -0.002 0.033 0.020 0.076**
(0.065) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.042 -0.005 -0.006 0.027
(0.059) (0.039) (0.042) (0.021)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] -3.194 -8.928*** -8.230*** 3.228*
(3.893) (2.107) (2.070) (1.709)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.260** -0.076 -0.091 -0.076
(0.113) (0.107) (0.114) (0.088)
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.071 0.059 0.045 -0.001
(0.064) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.047 -0.042 -0.026 0.073
(0.089) (0.056) (0.049) (0.044)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.029 -0.011 -0.001 -0.057**
(0.065) (0.052) (0.054) (0.026)
ROA (t-1) 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.132 0.013 0.016 0.940
(0.332) (0.299) (0.268) (1.201)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.664*** 0.091** 0.249*** 0.324***
(0.093) (0.036) (0.043) (0.039)
Log [HHI (t-1)] 2.370*** 0.656 0.719 -1.379**
(0.685) (0.545) (0.544) (0.567)
Log [Number Relations (t-1)] -1.336*** -3.731***
(0.231) (0.197)
Firm fixed effects NO YES NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Bank fixed effects NO NO NO YES
Month Dummies YES YES NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
# Observations 12,181,556 12,181,556 12,181,556 12,181,556
# Banks 42 42 42 42
# Months 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.01 0.21 0.48 0.48
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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significant, implying that there was no differential impact regarding capital, at variance with 
what documented in previous works on the transmission of conventional monetary policy 
(Jiménez et al., 2012). We have two complementary explanations to this finding. First, as 
argued by Albertazzi et al. (2014), during systemic crises the nature of the bank lending 
channel may change. Second, regulatory capital, rather than leverage, may be the 
appropriate variable to look at during those crises. In fact, Albertazzi et al. (2014), who use the 
supervisory Tier 1 capital ratio, find that the VLTROs were more effective in improving lending 
supply to SMEs (compared to larger firms) for illiquid but well-capitalised banks. By contrast, 
Jiménez et al. (2012), in their study of conventional monetary policy mostly before the 
economic crisis (2002-2008), find that both illiquid and low-capitalised banks reacted more to 
changes in short-term interest rates.  
Column (2), in which we drop the interaction between capital and VLTRO to rule out 
multicollinearity issues, confirms the result regarding liquidity. The results of column (2) can 
also be used to compute the aggregate impact of VLTROs on annual credit growth when 
accounting for the heterogenous impact regarding liquidity. To do so we replace equation (4) 
by equation (6):  
∂∆Creditijt
∂VLTROit = β+ γLIQı������ 
where LIQı������ is the average liquidity of each bank in the 3 months prior to the first VLTRO.28
  
 We 
then compute equation (3), obtaining 0.85%, a very similar figure to the previous estimate 
                                                                            
28. We use average liquidity values to deal with the volatility of the liquidity ratio.  
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Table 4: impact of VLTROs on credit  
(capital and liquidity interactions) 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans.  HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.055 0.083***
(0.052) (0.030)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Liquidity Ratio (t-1) -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Capital Ratio (t-1) 0.006
(0.006)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.037* 0.040*
(0.022) (0.021)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 3.431* 3.218*
(1.824) (1.798)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.123 -0.079
(0.109) (0.092)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.016 -0.022
(0.045) (0.042)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.084* 0.075*
(0.045) (0.043)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.049* -0.052*
(0.027) (0.026)
ROA (t-1) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 1.023 1.118
(1.209) (1.240)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.325*** 0.325***
(0.039) (0.040)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -1.496*** -1.597***
(0.552) (0.544)
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Month Dummies NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank
# Observations 12,181,556 12,181,556
# Banks 42 42
# Months 23 23
R-squared 0.48 0.48
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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Finally, another important research question that may be addressed is whether the 
impact that the VLTROs had on credit to non-financial corporations depended on the size of 
the companies. This is an important issue because SMEs depend much more on bank credit 
than larger companies as they often do not have access to alternative sources of external 
finance (debt and equity markets), which makes them much more vulnerable to a credit 
crunch.  
In order to answer that question, we add to the previous dataset an indicator variable 
constructed by Martínez Carrascal and Mulino (2014) that distinguishes between SMEs and 
larger firms. Specifically, they use the balance sheet and the income statement of each firm 
from the Central de Balances (CBI), a database owned by Banco de España. With those 
data, in the case of firms that are both in the Spanish Credit Register (CIR) and in the CBI, 
they assess whether they are SMEs or not by following the criteria of the European 
Commission recommendation 2003/361: a company is an SME if it has less than 250 
employees and its turnover does not exceed 50 million Euro or its balance sheet total is not 
greater than 43 million Euro. With those firms they also run several probit models to estimate 
the relationship between size category and total outstanding bank credit for each industry.29  
As the information on outstanding credit and industry is available in the CIR as well, they the 
use the predicted probabilities for each firm that is not the CBI (around 30%) to estimate its 
size category.30
We use the values of the variable at the end of December 2011, i.e., when the first 
VLTRO took place. The sample has around 307,700 firms, from which 305,000 are SMEs 
and the rest are large companies. We estimate our most complete specification (4) –time-
varying firm fixed effects and bank fixed effects- for the two size categories separately. The 
results, presented in Table 5, indicate that the VLTROs had no impact on the credit to large 
firms, but they had a sizeable effect on the loans to SMEs. In fact, the coefficient on the key 
regressor in the subsample of SMEs is very similar to the coefficient that was estimated using 
the whole sample (see Table 3). 
  
  
                                                                            
29. Specifically, for 99 industries following the NACE classification. 
30. Specifically, they classify as an SME those firms that have a predicted probability of being an SME greater than 90% 
and they classify as a large company those that have a predicted probability lower than 40%. Those firms that have a 
probability between 40% and 90% are left unclassified. For details about the goodness of fit and classification errors of 
the model see Martínez Carrascal and Mulino (2014). 
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Table 5: impact of VLTROs on credit to large firms and SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Dependent variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan 
ratio. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimations of separate regressions run on sub-samples of large 
companies and SMEs, respectively, following the classifications of European Commission (2003) 
and Martínez Carrascal and Mulino (2014). 
 
Large SMEs
(1) (2)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.001 0.077**
(0.033) (0.031)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.094** 0.026
(0.035) (0.021)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 7.896*** 3.024*
(2.657) (1.747)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.257 -0.072
(0.310) (0.084)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.076 0.004
(0.094) (0.041)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.209** 0.070
(0.103) (0.044)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.049 -0.056**
(0.050) (0.027)
ROA (t-1) -0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] -2.414 1.065
(3.322) (1.123)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.768*** 0.309***
(0.123) (0.039)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -3.232 -1.299**
(2.275) (0.595)
Log [Number Relations (t-1)]
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Month Dummies NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank
# Observations 232,175 11,818,378
# Banks 42 42
# Months 24 24
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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7  Robustness analyses  
7.1 Alternative liquidity and capital measures  
Our first robustness check is to use alternative measures of liquidity and capital. Specifically, 
we substitute Liquidity Ratio by Liquidity Ratio 2 in our main regressions and we include the 
ratio of domestic sovereign debt to total assets (Sovereign Debt) to account for the possible 
different impact of sovereign debt holdings from other types of liquid assets. We also replace 
Capital Ratio by Capital Ratio 2.31
  
 The results, which are displayed in Table 6, are very similar 
to those from Table 3. The coefficient on our regressor of interest, VLTRO, is again 
insignificant in specifications (1) to (3) and its magnitude and significance level in our favourite 
estimation (4) are very similar. Like Liquidity Ratio, neither Liquidity Ratio 2 nor Sovereign Debt 
has a significant impact on credit growth. Like Capital Ratio, Capital Ratio 2 is negative (and 
significant) in our inconsistent estimation (1).  
                                                                            
31. For brevity of exposition, we only show the results for Liquidity Ratio 2 and Capital Ratio 2, but the analyses with the 
other two possible combinations (Liquidity Ratio and Capital Ratio 2; Liquidity Ratio 2 and Capital Ratio) have also been 
carried out, yielding similar results, which are available upon request.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1512 
Table 6: impact of VLTROs on credit 
(alternative liquidity and capital measures) 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
 
We also use these alternative measures of liquidity and capital to assess whether the 
transmission of the VLTROs depended on banks’ characteristics via interactions with our key 
regressor, as displayed in Table 7. As in Table 4, we find that the impact of VLTRO on credit 
growth does not depend on capital heterogeneity. Regarding liquidity, the interaction between 
VLTRO and Liquidity Ratio 2 is not significant, but that between VLTRO and Sovereign Debt is 
significant and negative: the impact of VLTRO on credit growth is higher for lower sovereign debt 
holdings relative to total assets. This finding suggests that not all types of liquid assets played the 
same role in the transmission of the funds provided by the VLTROs to the real economy.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.017 0.051 0.044 0.066**
(0.087) (0.051) (0.059) (0.030)
Liquidity Ratio 2 (t-1) 0.025 -0.008 -0.004 0.009
(0.060) (0.041) (0.046) (0.024)
Sovereign Debt (t-1) -0.081 -0.057 -0.080 0.041
(0.112) (0.072) (0.083) (0.048)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] -5.502 -9.368*** -8.713*** 3.072*
(3.401) (1.981) (1.906) (1.781)
Capital Ratio 2 (t-1) -0.306*** -0.108 -0.124 -0.090
(0.107) (0.100) (0.108) (0.063)
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.013 0.040 0.022 -0.024
(0.069) (0.037) (0.043) (0.045)
Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.001 -0.054 -0.041 0.087*
(0.080) (0.052) (0.045) (0.050)
Non-resident Deposits (t-1) -0.018 -0.007 0.005 -0.055*
(0.067) (0.055) (0.058) (0.028)
ROA (t-1) 0.009** 0.003 0.004* 0.003*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.014 -0.025 -0.039 1.081
(0.340) (0.305) (0.272) (1.147)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.665*** 0.093*** 0.254*** 0.324***
(0.092) (0.033) (0.040) (0.039)
Log [HHI (t-1)] 2.384*** 0.645 0.737 -1.398**
(0.687) (0.538) (0.550) (0.647)
Log [Number Relations (t-1)] -1.341*** -3.735***
Firm fixed effects NO YES NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Bank fixed effects NO NO NO YES
Month dummies YES YES NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
# Observations 12,181,556 12,181,556 12,181,556 12,181,556
# Banks 42 42 42 42
# Months 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.01 0.21 0.48 0.48
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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Table 7: impact of VLTROs on credit  
(capital and liquidity interactions, alternative measures) 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio. 
 
(1) (2)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.150** 0.142***
(0.062) (0.051)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Liquidity Ratio 2 (t-1) -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Sovereign Debt (t-1) -0.009** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Capital Ratio 2 (t-1) -0.002
(0.006)
Liquidity Ratio 2 (t-1) 0.028 0.027
(0.026) (0.026)
Sovereign Debt (t-1) 0.144* 0.139*
(0.076) (0.071)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 3.740* 3.764**
(1.880) (1.795)
Capital Ratio 2 (t-1) -0.080 -0.092
(0.088) (0.063)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.037 -0.035
(0.050) (0.047)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.107** 0.108**
(0.050) (0.050)
Non-resident Deposits (t-1) -0.052 -0.050*
(0.032) (0.029)
ROA (t-1) 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 1.225 1.185
(1.196) (1.128)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.326*** 0.326***
(0.039) (0.039)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -1.645** -1.618**
(0.640) (0.652)
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Month dummies NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank
# Observations 12,181,556 12,181,556
# Banks 42 42
# Months 23 23
R-squared 0.48 0.48
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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7.2 Sample without credit cooperatives  
A second robustness check consists of running the same regressions in a sub-sample of 
credit institutions that excludes credit cooperatives. While many of them did not ask for funds 
in the VLTROs, anecdotal evidence suggests that they might have obtained the liquidity 
indirectly, through inter-bank loans, which would have allowed them to grant more credit to 
the private sector. If that was indeed the case, their inclusion would generate a downward 
bias in the coefficient on VLTRO. In addition, the credit cooperatives of our sample only 
account for a 3% of the total loans, implying that taking them out does not jeopardise the 
external validity of our results. However, a disadvantage of this strategy regards statistical 
inference: as we have less banks, we also have less clusters (28 vis-à-vis 42 with the whole 
sample). As cluster-robust standard errors are downwards biased when there are few 
clusters (Cameron et al., 2008), we may over-reject the null hypothesis concerning the 
significance of the regression coefficients.   
The results for this subsample, which are presented in Table 8, are slightly different 
from those with the whole sample. The coefficient on VLTRO is insignificant in specifications 
(1) and (3) but, unlike in previous analyses, it is significant and positive in (2), when time-
invariant fixed effects are included. More remarkably, its magnitude in our favourite estimation 
(4) is larger than with the whole sample (0.096 vs. 0.076), which corroborates our intuition 
that the inclusion of credit cooperatives could have generated a downward bias. Using this 
coefficient the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on annual credit growth is 1%, 2 pp. 
higher than the one estimated with the whole sample.  
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Table 8: impact of VLTROs on credit 
(sample without credit cooperatives) 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
 
We can also use this subsample to analyse the heterogeneity in the transmission of 
the VLTROs via interactions with our key regressor, as displayed in Table 9. As with the whole 
sample, the interaction with capital is not significant while the interaction with liquidity is 
negative and significant: the positive impact of VLTROS on credit growth was higher on 
illiquid banks, while there was no differential impact regarding capital. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.081 0.083* 0.071 0.096**
(0.082) (0.045) (0.048) (0.038)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.148** 0.072 0.076 0.045**
(0.072) (0.044) (0.046) (0.022)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 4.784 -4.008 -2.831 3.640**
(4.967) (2.555) (2.401) (1.717)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.251* -0.086 -0.095 -0.093
(0.132) (0.116) (0.128) (0.093)
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.066 0.060 0.053 -0.009
(0.074) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.169* 0.028 0.054 0.093**
(0.095) (0.059) (0.047) (0.044)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.053 -0.027 -0.016 -0.068**
(0.058) (0.048) (0.052) (0.030)
ROA (t-1) 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.776* 0.468 0.478 0.680
(0.415) (0.330) (0.294) (1.211)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.700*** 0.111*** 0.278*** 0.339***
(0.101) (0.038) (0.046) (0.041)
Log [HHI (t-1)] 3.117*** 1.239** 1.291** -1.212*
(0.759) (0.562) (0.551) (0.615)
Log [Number Relations (t-1)] -1.390*** -3.695***
(0.235) (0.204)
Firm fixed effects NO YES NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Bank fixed effects NO NO NO YES
Month Dummies YES YES NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
# Observations 11,435,407 11,435,407 11,435,407 11,435,407
# Banks 28 28 28 28
# Months 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.01 0.22 0.50 0.50
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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Table 9: impact of VLTROs on credit 
(capital and liquidity interactions, sample without credit cooperatives) 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
 
 
(1) (2)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.074 0.101**
(0.055) (0.039)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Liquidity Ratio (t-1) -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Capital Ratio (t-1) 0.008
(0.007)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.048** 0.054**
(0.023) (0.021)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 3.814** 3.584*
(1.800) (1.821)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.150 -0.093
(0.114) (0.096)
NPL Ratio (t-1) -0.028 -0.028
(0.050) (0.049)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.103** 0.090**
(0.045) (0.043)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.058* -0.064**
(0.032) (0.030)
ROA (t-1) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.788 0.855
(1.199) (1.248)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.340*** 0.339***
(0.041) (0.041)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -1.346** -1.395**
(0.612) (0.593)
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Month Dummies NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank
# Observations 11,435,407 11,435,407
# Banks 28 28
# Months 23 23
R-squared 0.50 0.50
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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8 Conclusions 
The intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis in the second half of 2011 hampered 
euro area banks’ access to market based-funding, especially in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain. The funding and deleveraging pressures borne by those credit institutions 
risked curtailing lending to euro area households and non-financial firms. Against this 
background, the ECB carried out two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs), 
characterised as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment and a maturity of three years, 
in December 2011 and February 2012, with the aim to forestall a further contraction of credit 
through the mitigation of liquidity and funding risks. The participation in these operations by 
banks was very large, implying a massive liquidity injection in the financial sector.  
The goal of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the VLTROs in the case of 
Spain. While lending to the non-financial private sector kept declining after the implementation 
of those measures, would it have declined much more if the VLTROs hadn’t taken place? The 
Spanish experience is particularly informative because Spain was severely hit by the European 
sovereign debt crisis, it is one of the largest economies in the euro area and it has a bank-
based financial system.   
To answer that question two main identification challenges must be addressed. First, 
credit supply must be disentangled from credit demand, as the extremely weak 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing in that period reduced credit demand and increased 
credit risk, leading to a contraction of credit growth. Second, as banks facing strong funding 
and deleveraging pressures were likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain 
credit supply, the VLTRO bids are expected to be an endogenous regressor in naïve 
specifications. 
To tackle those identification challenges we use a sample on more than one million 
bank-firm relationships drawn from the Credit Register of Banco de España. Following Gan 
(2007) and Khwaya and Mian (2008), we exploit the fact that many firms simultaneously 
borrow from several banks, which allows to compare credit growth across different lenders 
for the same firm in the same period. This within-firm comparison controls for all observable 
and unobservable, time-invariant and time-varying firm characteristics, including firm-specific 
changes in credit demand and risk. Regarding the second problem, we exhaustively control 
for banks’ funding difficulties by constructing several measures of balance-sheet strength 
(capital, liquidity, credit risk, etc) using the confidential supervisory reports owned by Banco 
de España and we add bank fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.    
Our findings suggest that VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the 
supply of bank credit to firms in the twelve months after the first VLTRO (December 2011- 
November 2012), providing evidence of a “bank lending channel” in the context of 
unconventional monetary policy. Specifically, the aggregate impact of the two VLTROs on 
annual credit growth ranged between 0.8% and 1%32
                                                                            
32. Due to our empirical approach, notice that we only measure the temporary impact of the VLTROs on the supply of 
credit. As the VLTRO uptakes were essentially long-term loans to banks, which had to be repaid at some time, the 
existence of a permanent effect seems unlikely.   
. We also study whether the VLTROs 
had a heterogeneous impact on banks depending of their balance-sheet strength. We find, as 
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in previous literature, that the impact was greater on illiquid banks, but we find no differential 
effect regarding capital. We have two complementary explanations to this finding. First, as 
argued by Albertazzi et al. (2014), during systemic crises the nature of the bank lending 
channel may change. Second, regulatory capital, rather than leverage, may be the 
appropriate variable to look at during those crises. Finally, we find that the VLTROs had a 
sizeable impact on the credit to SMEs, while they had no effect on the loans to large firms. 
This is an important aspect to take into account when assessing the effectiveness of the 
VLTROs because SMEs are much more vulnerable to a credit crunch than larger companies, 
as they often do not have access to alternative sources of external finance. 
Since our identification strategy relies in the use of firms with multiple bank 
relationships, a limitation of our study is that we must exclude firms that only operate with one 
bank. As those firms account for around 62% of the total number of firms but they only 
account for 25% of the outstanding credit33, we may infer that they are smaller (and probably 
younger) than those with multiple bank relationships34. As argued by Gan (2007), small and 
young firms are more affected by the information asymmetry in the credit markets due to 
higher “information costs”, so we should expect the lending channel to be stronger in their 
case. This is also consistent with the findings of Kwhaja y Mian (2008, pp. 1426-1427), who 
find the lending channel to be stronger in firms that only operate with one bank.35
Another limitation of our study is that it only evaluates the direct impact of the 
VLTROs on bank credit, ignoring some important indirect channels, such as their positive 
effect on investors’ confidence, on the euro interbank market, on sovereign spreads and on 
banks’ balance sheets. All these channels may have been translated into more lending to the 
private sector. 
 Hence, by 
excluding those firms, we may consider our estimates the lower bound of the aggregate 
effect on the credit on all companies.  
 
                                                                            
33. Source: Spanish Credit Register, December 2011.  
34. .This conclusion is  consistent with the findings of Hernández-Cánovas and Köeter-Kant (2008) and Ongena and 
Smith (2000): the larger (and the older) the firm, the higher the likelihood of having multiple banking relationships.  
35. The same conclusion can be drawn from Jiménez et al. (2012, pp. 2313-2317), if one compares the results of Table 
2 (all firms) with those of Table 3 (only firms with more than one banking relationship).   
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9 Appendix A: variables’ correlation matrix 
Credit Growth 
(t)
VLTRO*I
(t>2011M11)
Liquidity Ratio 
(t-1)
Liquidity Ratio 2 
(t-1)
Sovereign Debt 
(t-1)
Log [Loan to 
Deposits (t-1)]
Capital Ratio 
(t-1)
Capital Ratio 2 
(t-1)
NPL Ratio (t-1)
Resident 
Deposits (t-1)
Non-resident 
Deposits (t-1)
ROA (t-1)
Log [Total 
Assets (t-1)]
Relationship 
Length (t-1)
Log [Number 
Relations (t-1)]
Log [HHI (t-1)]
Credit Growth (t) 1
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.022 1
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) -0.003 -0.366 1
Liquidity Ratio 2 (t-1) 0.002 0.148 0.546 1
Sovereign Debt (t-1) 0.014 0.436 0.063 -0.044 1
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] -0.050 -0.035 -0.227 -0.213 0.116 1
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.034 -0.091 0.116 0.185 -0.230 0.065 1
Capital Ratio 2 (t-1) -0.040 -0.215 0.267 0.218 -0.277 0.065 0.923 1
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.038 0.579 -0.468 -0.122 0.238 -0.054 -0.338 -0.497 1
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.048 -0.048 0.081 0.055 -0.209 -0.892 -0.175 -0.171 0.015 1
Non-resident Deposits (t-1) -0.055 -0.328 0.132 -0.093 -0.033 0.676 0.294 0.349 -0.329 -0.724 1
ROA (t-1) -0.016 -0.309 0.292 0.096 -0.189 0.011 0.166 0.389 -0.439 0.022 0.162 1
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] -0.046 -0.106 -0.014 0.098 -0.076 0.567 0.183 0.256 -0.260 -0.698 0.672 0.093 1
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.050 0.609 -0.377 0.071 0.271 -0.020 0.122 0.019 0.375 -0.118 -0.164 -0.242 0.052 1
Log [Number Relations (t-1)] -0.013 0.035 -0.023 -0.027 0.045 0.031 -0.049 -0.056 0.041 -0.023 -0.008 -0.030 -0.039 0.079 1
Log [HHI (t-1)] 0.061 0.257 -0.143 -0.139 0.126 -0.414 -0.454 -0.515 0.516 0.463 -0.602 -0.245 -0.506 -0.041 0.031 1
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10 Appendix B: robustness check for M&A  
As explained in the paper, we have treated all M&A as acquisitions by the largest bank 
because the alternative option, regarding them as the birth of a new bank, would imply 
breaks in the series. Nevertheless, a potential caveat of our approach is that we are implicitly 
assuming that the acquiring bank and the bank that arises after the merger is the same credit 
institution (conditional on observables such as credit growth or balance-sheet ratios). This 
assumption may seem pretty reasonable when the merger takes place between a very large 
(acquiring) bank and one or more very small (acquired) banks, as the new credit institution is 
likely to have the business model and the management of the former. But the assumption 
may be too strong when the merger occurs among several banks of similar size and very 
different characteristics, implying that the credit institution created by the merger may be a 
very different from any of their predecessors. This issue may be especially problematic in our 
case, as we rely on bank fixed effects in our regressions.  
To check the sensitivity of the results to this assumption we have eliminated the 
observations of all the banks involved in a merger before the merger actually takes place. By 
doing so we don’t have to impose that assumption in our identification strategy and we also 
avoid any jumps in the series (at the expense, of course, of losing some observations). The 
main caveat of this alternative approach is that we lose two banks in our sample, as two 
mergers occurred after the VLTROs took place. As our key regressor is the product of the 
gross amount of funds borrowed at the two VLTROs scaled by the bank’s total assets 
(VLTROi) and an indicator variable I(t ≥ 2011M12) that equals 1 since the implementation of 
the first VLTRO, for these two banks the value of the regressor is constant over time. As we 
also include bank fixed effects in our regressions, the observations on these banks have to be 
excluded. 
Nevertheless, the main results, shown in Tables B1 and B2, are very similar to those 
reported in the main text.36
  
  
                                                                            
36. We have also carried out the robustness analyses shown in the main text (alternative capital and liquidity ratios, 
sample without credit cooperatives) using this dataset. The results, available upon request, are also very similar.  
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Table B1: impact of VLTROs on credit 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.001 0.039 0.029 0.076**
(0.066) (0.036) (0.039) (0.032)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.043 -0.004 -0.004 0.002
(0.064) (0.040) (0.044) (0.024)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] -2.897 -8.473*** -7.717*** 2.380*
(3.891) (2.087) (2.077) (1.266)
Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.283** -0.071 -0.094 0.071
(0.119) (0.106) (0.117) (0.062)
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.085 0.078** 0.061 0.023
(0.065) (0.038) (0.044) (0.043)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.053 -0.034 -0.018 0.066**
(0.089) (0.055) (0.049) (0.033)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.042 -0.030 -0.021 -0.056**
(0.064) (0.051) (0.053) (0.027)
ROA (t-1) 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 0.197 0.095 0.094 3.003***
(0.331) (0.291) (0.263) (0.998)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.704*** 0.111*** 0.279*** 0.351***
(0.092) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039)
Log [HHI (t-1)] 2.219*** 0.382 0.426 -1.182*
(0.670) (0.496) (0.486) (0.623)
Log [Number Relations (t-1)] -1.440*** -3.770***
(0.224) (0.185)
Firm fixed effects NO YES NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects NO NO YES YES
Bank fixed effects NO NO NO YES
Month Dummies YES YES NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank Bank Bank
# Observations 11,858,404 11,858,404 11,858,404 11,858,404
# Banks 40 40 40 40
# Months 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.01 0.21 0.49 0.49
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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Table B2: impact of VLTROs on credit 
 
 
 
Estimator: OLS. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Dependent 
variable: monthly annualised growth rate of outstanding loans. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of the bank’s credit portfolio by industry.  NPL ratio is the non-performing loan ratio. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) 0.090* 0.082**
(0.053) (0.032)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Liquidity Ratio (t-1) -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
VLTRO*I(t>2011M11) X Capital Ratio (t-1) -0.002
(0.006)
Liquidity Ratio (t-1) 0.014 0.014
(0.025) (0.025)
Log [Loan to Deposits (t-1)] 2.264 2.371*
(1.549) (1.374)
Capital Ratio (t-1) 0.091 0.073
(0.104) (0.063)
NPL Ratio (t-1) 0.000 0.002
(0.047) (0.044)
Resident Deposits (t-1) 0.067* 0.070**
(0.035) (0.031)
No Resident Deposits (t-1) -0.050* -0.050*
(0.027) (0.026)
ROA (t-1) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Log [Total Assets (t-1)] 3.438*** 3.355***
(1.156) (1.053)
Relationship Length (t-1) 0.352*** 0.352***
(0.040) (0.040)
Log [HHI (t-1)] -1.423** -1.407**
(0.619) (0.601)
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Firm-month fixed effects YES YES
Bank fixed effects YES YES
Month Dummies NO NO
Cluster level Bank Bank
# Observations 11,858,404 11,858,404
# Banks 40 40
# Months 23 23
R-squared 0.49 0.49
Dep. Var. Credit Growth
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